The Subjugating Discourse in the Mideast: A Commentary on Cordesman by Editor, IBPP
International Bulletin of Political 
Psychology 
Volume 12 Issue 12 Article 3 
3-29-2002 
The Subjugating Discourse in the Mideast: A Commentary on 
Cordesman 
Editor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, International Relations Commons, Near and 
Middle Eastern Studies Commons, Other Political Science Commons, Other Psychology Commons, Peace 
and Conflict Studies Commons, and the Terrorism Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Editor (2002) "The Subjugating Discourse in the Mideast: A Commentary on Cordesman," International 
Bulletin of Political Psychology: Vol. 12 : Iss. 12 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol12/iss12/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
International Bulletin of Political Psychology 
1 
 
Title: The Subjugating Discourse in the Mideast: A Commentary on Cordesman 
Author: Editor  
Volume: 12 
Issue: 12 
Date: 2002-03-29 
Keywords: Israel, Mideast, Palestinian, Terrorism 
 
Abstract.  This article provides a commentary on a recently published approach to a US-led process for 
peace between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority. 
 
Anthony Cordesman, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has recently 
written an article for The New York Times that recommends a United States (US)-led process for peace 
between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA).  There are a number of features concerning 
this article that are both common to many hypothesized routes to peace and problematic to the 
appearance of peace.  These features can be termed examples of subjugating discourse.  Here, 
subjugating discourse denotes language describing a reality that (1) may not conform to common 
requirements for reality mandated by empiricism and logic and (2) renders the problems of maintaining 
desirable political power not only more difficult but also more easily tolerable--thus adding and 
sometimes founding the basis of this difficulty. 
 
First, Cordesman assumes that the US can, indeed, forge a peace between two contesting entities.  Yet, 
there may not be only two such entities.  A partial list of other entities with political, politico-military, 
and economic influence over and interests concerning the conflict and the possibility of peace includes 
the European Union, individual nation-states that are allies of the US, a huge concatenation called "The 
Arab Nation" that includes anything from governmental leaders of Arab nation-states to paramilitary 
groupings and the man and woman in the street, individual nation-states that are formally neutral or 
adversarial to the US and formally allied with or neutral to segments of "The Arab Nation," a huge 
concatenation called "The Islamic World," and various illicit trafficking networks of drugs, weapons, and 
people. 
 
One might render the descriptive inadequacy of "two contesting entities" moot, if the US actually 
possessed assets necessary to appropriately influence all significant parties to the conflict.  Yet such a 
status of political power is unarguably lacking for the US based on budgetary realities and on political 
psychological realities concerning contemporary waves of anti-US animi.  Moreover, that the US could 
lead a successful process to peace with hotly involved contestants and protestants--in a world wherein 
psychology generating suicidal behavior mitigates objective advantages of economics and military 
forces--defies the facts on the ground. 
 
Second, Cordesman engages in legal, ethical, and moral equivalency concerning the violence between 
Israel on the one hand and certain segments of "The Arab Nation" and "The Islamic World" on the other.  
He does this by explicitly employing the language of "Palestinian terrorism" and "Israeli 
counterterrorism."  Here, "counterterrorisnm" seems to refer not to non-terrorist intervention for 
counterterrorist purposes, but engaging in terrorism as a counter to terrorism. 
 
Cordesman's language necessarily validates a reality that both sides are engaging in terrorism.  Again, 
this might be the case if one chose some definition of terrorism that would subsume violence 
perpetrated by Israel and segments of "The Arab Nation" and "The Islamic World."  But given one 
common definition that terrorism involves intended and politically motivated violence against civilians 
1
: The Subjugating Discourse in the Mideast
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2002
International Bulletin of Political Psychology 
2 
 
who are non-participants in violence (by most stretches of the imagination--except that of terrorist logic 
wherein all people are inherently complicit with the Original Sin of living), terrorism is not the policy of 
the Israeli Government as it is with some of its adversaries. 
 
That is not to say that the Israelis are right and its terrorist adversaries wrong in the ongoing conflict.  
Terrorism may well be a justified tool of political struggle and is certainly one that paramilitary entities 
of what became Israel and some succeeding Israeli military and paramilitary personnel have employed. 
 
As an additional note on the terrorism question, IBPP notes that the language of "Palestinian terrorism" 
and "Israeli counterterrorism" ineluctably describes a violent world wherein the Palestinians go first and 
the Israelis follow.  Depending on how one chooses to enter the stream of ongoing political behavior, 
the "counter" could be applied with equal or unequal opportunity to various employers of violence so 
that one would perceive "Israeli terrorism" and "Palestinian counterterrorism." 
 
Third, Cordesman is a victim of one of the great victories of 20th and 21st century propaganda.  This 
victory is the common acceptance--even by the Israelis--that "Palestinian" accurately applies only to the 
people claiming representation by the PNA, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Hamas, Islamic 
Jihad, or other organizations embracing Arab (and usually Islamic) individuals who once lived or still live 
in (or whose ancestors once lived in) the various incarnations of the Land of Palestine.  In actuality, 
anyone who has lived or is living in (or whose ancestors once lived in) the Land of Palestine are 
Palestinians.  Perhaps only a suprahuman individual might wish to surmise on the effects on violence of 
a more inclusive employment of "Palestinian." 
 
Fourth, and, perhaps most troubling, Cordesman consistently advocates a political, legal, ethical, and 
moral equivalency between Israel and its adversaries.  That Cordesman may be correct must be 
accepted before analysis and might be accepted after it.  However, his analysis--primarily the assertions 
that Israel and some of its adversaries both use terrorism, violence, have leaders who make mistakes--
focuses on means instead of ends.  Which sides most rightly deserve land and self-determination and 
political sovereignty and full membership in the United Nations?  All?  Some?  None?  There is certainly 
precedent that there are winners and losers, victors who had injustice on their side and losers who have 
gone down with justice, and so on.  Cordesman does not make a case. 
 
It may well be that the US should take nobody's side, one side, or some sides.  To expend resources 
everywhere there is injustice, its threat, or its allegation is a prescription for a US mortal wounding 
based on resource overextension.  So, is Cordesman only asking us to read between the lines of his 
article and to appreciate that the language of equality and equivalency must be used as a means to 
peace and not as an honest expression of perceived or constructed reality.  The problems of such an 
approach are not only moral but logistical within a globalized world that (via telecommunications) 
resembles a fishbowl and sieve not an opaque container wherein secrecy is more likely. 
 
In conclusion, Cordesman's prescription for peace seems destined to subjugate us to more tragedy and 
violence.  The power of language seems powerful indeed.  (See Barber, B.K.  (2001). Political violence, 
social integration, and youth functioning: Palestinian youth from the Intifada.  Journal of Community 
Psychology, 29, 259-280; Cordesman, A.  (March 22, 2002).  The Middle East's failed leaders.  The New 
York Times, p. A27; Kogan, S.M.  (1998). The politics of making meaning: Discourse analysis of a 
"postmodern" interview. Journal of Family Therapy, 20, 229-251; Mollov, B., & Lavie, C.  (2001). Culture, 
dialogue, and perception change in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. International Journal of Conflict 
Management, 12, 69-87; Wood, G. G., & Roche, S. E.  (2001). Situations and representations: Feminist 
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practice with survivors of male violence. Families in Society, 82, 583-590.)  (Keywords: Israel, Mideast, 
Palestinian, Terrorism.) 
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